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SECURITIES AND COMMODITY FUTURES REGULATION

G.

KELLAM SCOTr*

OVERVIEW

This Survey Article is limited to a discussion of the three cases decided during the survey period which principally address the Securities
Act of 19331 (Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (Exchange
Act), and the Commodity Exchange Act of 19743 (CEA). During the
survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided two cases that reaffirmed previous decisions respecting the definition of "security," one of which also
discussed "controlling person" liability under the federal securities
laws. The third and probably the most significant case, reaffirmed the
scienter requirement in fraud actions under the CEA and rejected the
"trust and confidence" test in state law fiduciary duty claims between a
broker and its customer.
I.

COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT: HILL V. BACHE HALSEY
STUART SHIELDS INC.

In Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc. ,4 the Tenth Circuit reversed
a judgment awarding plaintiff Glenn Hill damages in the total amount of
$2,047,0005 under claims that Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Incorporated (Bache), his futures commission merchant (broker), 6 engaged in
unauthorized trading in his account and misrepresented or failed to dis7
close material facts, all in violation of section 4b(A) of the CEA.
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Stuart James Research Center, University of Denver College of Law. B.S. Rutgers College, 1970; Ed.M. Rutgers University,
1971;J.D. Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, 1977.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1985).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ii (1985).
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (1985).
4. 790 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. Judgment was entered in the district court, after a six-day trial. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of Hill on all of his claims and in favor of defendant on its counterclaim
for breach of contract. Judgment, as amended, was entered providing Hill $64,795.55 in
compensatory damages ($47,000 on verdict plus $17,795.55 in prejudgment interest) plus
$2,000,000 for exemplary or punitive damages, for a total of $2,064,795.55. Bache was
awarded $2,390.50 on its counterclaim for breach of contract. Id. at 820 n. 1.
6. A "futures commission merchant" (FCM) is a firm with access to trading rights on
a commodity exchange. A "futures commission agent" is the registered representative of
the FCM. Throughout this article "broker" will be used interchangeably to refer to both
an FCM and its registered representative. For the purposes of this article, the same principles apply to an FCM as apply to a securities broker-dealer; any differences are beyond the
scope of this survey article.
7. 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)(A) (1976). Section 6b of the CEA provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful... (2) for any person, in or in connection with any order to
make ... any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery, made, or to be
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Facts

Hill, a farmer from Haxtun, Colorado, called Bache in November of
1979 and opened a nondiscretionary commodities account 8 trading
corn, pork belly, and cattle futures through Wayne Wright, a futures
commission agent in the Denver office of Bache. At the time his account
was opened, Hill was given and signed a copy of the Bache Customer
Agreement, a Commodity Suitability Letter, and a Risk Disclosure Statement. Between November, 1979, and February, 1980, Wright executed
fifty-nine commodities transactions 9 in Hill's account. During this same
period of trading, Wright and Hill engaged in at least sixty-five conversations over the telephone, including three conversations in which Hill
complained that he was "losing money" and that Wright was "getting
into things" Hill did not want to purchase.' 0 Confirmations for the
transactions were sent to Hill for each trade. Hill received the confirmations within four days of each trade, but, outside of the telephone discussions, never complained about the trades, even though he admitted
reading the confirmations. As fortune would have it, due to internamade, on or subject to the rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of any
other person ...
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false
report or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such
person any false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any
means whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or
execution of any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with respect to such order or contract for such person.
7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
8. Hill, 790 F.2d at 828. A nondiscretionary account requires the authorization of
the customer prior to each trade. A discretionary account allows the broker to trade without express authorization from its customer.
9. Commodities transactions involve the purchase or sale of commodity futures contracts. A commodity futures contract requires the purchaser (seller) to buy (sell) a specified quantity of a commodity with delivery of the underlying goods at a future date.
Futures contracts are traded on margin. The leveraged transactions, as is the case in securities accounts, may result in compound gains or losses as the price of the commodity
changes. Some traders engage in commodity futures trading for speculative purposes, i.e.,
realization of gain due to occurrence of anticipated price fluctuations. Other traders, such
as a corn farmer trading corn futures, trade in order to hedge business risks by selling or
buying futures contracts to protect against possible adverse price changes. Settlement of
futures contracts by delivery of the consideration (cash/commodity) is unusual and occurs
in less than five percent of the contracts. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODrrY TRADING
MANUAL 31 (1980). Usually anr offsetting purchase or sale is effected to liquidate or close
out the account. Thus, trading in a futures account must be effected rapidly as price fluctuations become known. When adverse price movement occurs, trades must be executed
quickly to reduce losses. See F. HORN & V. FARAH, TRADING IN COMMODITY FUTURES
(1979); CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL (1980). Although analo-

gies may be drawn between securities and commodities transactions, there are distinctions
between the two. For example, one may invest in securities or merely trade securities,
while commodities are usually traded due to their volatility and short life. A securities investor gains from capital appreciation and, if appropriate, dividends; a commodities trader
only benefits from price changes which must occur within relatively short periods of time.
The volatility that creates trading pressure in commodities transactions is unlike that occurring in securities, with the possible exception of options. This resultant trading pressure may suggest different threshold considerations for churning in commodity futures
cases as than in securities cases. See infra note 13.
10. Hill, 790 F.2d at 820.
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tional political events beyond Hill's control, the market fell sharply resulting in substantial losses for Hill. Due to the precipitous market
decline, Hill was required to make additional cash payments into his account, and his account was eventually closed with a negative balance.
Seeking compensation for his loss, Hill filed a civil action in federal
district court. " Hill claimed that Wright, upon whom Hill relied, failed
to fully discuss and properly advise Hill about the actual mechanics and
risk of loss associated with futures trading. 12 Hill alleged none of the
trades were discussed with him before their execution. Therefore, Hill
charged, the trades executed by Bache constituted "churning" or excessive unauthorized trading. 1 3 Hill argued that Bache churned his account and failed to disclose material facts regarding the nature of his
commodity futures account which violated section 4b of the CEA.' 4
Bache, on the other hand, argued that Hill authorized the trading in
his account during numerous telephone conversations, and that, in any
event, Hill received and read the confirmations without complaint,
thereby ratifying any previously unauthorized trades. 15 The jury rejected this claim and returned a verdict in Hill's favor. Bache appealed
the award and amount of damages.
B.

Scienter, A Necessary Element Under CEA Section 4b
1. The District Court's Constructive Fraud Instruction and
Section 4b Liability

A customer may recover damages from his broker under section 4b
of the CEA if he can prove fraud or willful conduct; a showing of mere
negligence, mistake, or inadvertence will not suffice. 1 6 At trial, the district court "instructed the jury that even 'constructive fraud' by a commodity futures broker violated § 4b(A)."' 17 The trial court defined
constructive fraud as "a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral
guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of the tendency to deceive, to
violate confidence or to injure public interests. Liability for constructive fraud
11. Under the CEA, Hill had several forums with which to pursue his damages remedies: a reparations proceeding before a Commodity Futures Trading Commission administrative law judge, 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982), arbitration, 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(ll) (1985), or a
private action, 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1985).
12. Hill, 790 F.2d at 820.
13. Id. at 820-21. "Churning" includes not only trading in excess of authority but
also that which is excessive in light of the customer's investment objective and financial
situation. In either event, trading which only benefits the broker through increased commissions, at the expense of the customer, is fraudulent. Churning of a securities account
violates Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 170-71 (10th Cir. 1974). Churning of a commodities account
should result in a violation of section 4b of the CEA.
14. Hill, 790 F.2d at 820-21.
15. Id. at 821.
16. Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Management, 586 F.2d 1352, 1355
(10th Cir. 1978).
17. Hill, 790 F.2d at 822. Hill initially asserted that Bache violated sections 4b(B) and
4b(C), as well as section 4b(A). During the course of the trial, however, Hill apparently
limited his case to reliance on section 4b(A).
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under [§ 4b] may be based on negligent acts or omission." '1 8
The trial court apparently agreed with Hill's argument that a breach
of state law fiduciary duty gives rise to an action under section 4b. Such
reasoning follows the decision of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,19 a reparations
case, in which the CFTC held that a negligent breach of fiduciary duty by a
20
commodity futures broker violates section 4b.
2.

The Tenth Circuit's Rejection of the District Court's
Culpability Standard

The Tenth Circuit, electing not to follow Gordon, reversed the trial
court's lenient fraud standard under section 4b. Relying upon its previous decision in Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Management Co.,21
and similar rationale applied by the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth and
Ninth circuits, 2 2 the court of appeals held the trial court's constructive
fraud instruction amounted to a negligence standard which, as applied
under federal securities law, is too broad. 23 Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit panel reasoned that section 4b is a fraud provision which makes
no reference to fiduciary duty. 24 The court stated that "the purpose of
fiduciary duty rules is to eliminate the need for a fraud inquiry." 2 5 Consistent with a conclusion that the two actions are not identical, the distinctions to be drawn between a fraud action and a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty are substantive and reflect more than procedural niceties.
Thus, as the court noted, the district court's jury instruction regarding
section 4b, with its reference to a "fraudulent" breach of duty and "negligent acts," does seem ambiguous and at best confusing. Judge Logan's
opinion admonished that "on retrial the district court should instruct
the jury that it must find willfulness for violation of § 4b or § 4b(A)" and
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 21,016 at 23,975 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980), af'd on other
grounds sub nom., Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 673
F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1982).
20. The wisdom and logic of the Gordon decision has been the subject of second guessing. See, e.g., Hunter v. Madda Trading Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,242 at 25,204
n.8 (CFTC Sept. 2, 1981); Markham, Customer Rights Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 37
VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1334-38 (1984).

21. 586 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1978).
22. Hill, 790 F.2d at 822. See Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785, 789 (8th Cir.
1985); McIlroy v. Dittmer, 732 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1984); First Commodity Corp. v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 676 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1982); Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1979); Haltmier v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 554 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1977); McCurnin v.
Kohlmeyer & Co., 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973).
23. Hill, 790 F.2d at 823. This standard of culpability requiring scienter also exists
under Colorado law. Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1983); People v. Milne,
690 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1984) (decided under former securities law); People v. Blair, 195
Colo. 462, 579 P.2d 1133 (1978) (jury instructions should be phrased in terms of "knowingly," willfully," and "aware"); People v. Terranova, 38 Colo. App. 476, 563 P.2d 363
(1976) (simple negligence alone is insufficient).
24. Hill, 790 F.2d at 823.
25. Id.
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26
that the instruction for section 4b "should not refer to fiduciary duty."

3.

Analysis

The Tenth Circuit's holding that intent beyond negligence is necessary to meet the scienter requirement is consistent with Master Commodities and is particularly appropriate in light of judicial precedent under
analogous securities fraud provisions. Hill does not state the minimum
standard necessary to meet the scienter requirement. The Tenth Circuit, however, previously addressed that issue in Hackbart v. Holmes, 2 7 a
decision postdating Master Commodities, but not discussed in Hill.
Although brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 28 reliance
upon Hackbart would not be misplaced.
Hackbart involved a civil action brought by Dale Hackbart against his
former college football teammate and longtime friend, James Holmes.
Using Holmes' attorney to prepare the necessary documents and relying
upon Holmes' business expertise to organize the new corporation,
Hackbart agreed to join Holmes as equal, or nearly equal, shareholders
of a corporation formed to carry out their joint business interests. After
the corporation was formed, shares of stock were issued to both Holmes
and Hackbart, Holmes receiving common stock and Hackbart receiving
non-participating preferred stock. Although Hackbart considered his
relationship with Holmes to be tantamount to "an equal partnership, ' 2 9
Hackbart's preferred shares were non-participating and did not permit
him to share in the success of the enterprise or corporate growth unless
they were previously converted by the board of directors, which Holmes
controlled. 30 Hackbart's shares were never converted. Eventually the
two had a falling out and agreed to liquidate the enterprise. It was then
that Holmes advised Hackbart he was only entitled to the $5,000 he contributed and that the preferred shares did not permit Hackbart to par31
ticipate in the corporation's success.
As a result, Hackbart sued Holmes seeking his "share" of the fruits
of their labor. The trial court entered judgment for Hackbart and
Holmes appealed. Affirming judgment for Hackbart, the Tenth Circuit
held that, respecting their business dealings, a relationship of trust existed between Hackbart and Holmes creating a duty of candor which
Holmes owed Hackbart. The court found that Holmes did not withhold
information from Hackbart, but that Holmes "acted recklessly in not
making sure Hackbart understood he was not going to participate in the
growth of the corporation." '32 Holmes breached his duty of candor
when he failed tofully disclose, in a manner understandable to Hackbart,
the actual nature of the interest Hackbart acquired in their corporation.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1983).
15 U.S.C. § 78 (b) (1985); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1116.
Id. at 1116-17.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1118, 1120.
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The court held Holmes liable, stating that recklessness will meet scien33
ter requirements under Rule lOb-5 of the federal securities laws.
By analogy to the federal securities laws, recklessness or gross negligence should meet the minimum culpability standard under CEA fraud
requirements.3 4 Under Master Commodities, "recovery must be based on
fraud or willful conduct, and not mere negligence, mistake or inadvertance." 3 5 Although at times the scienter requirement appears to
place an insurmountable obstacle in the path of plaintiffs, the Tenth Circuit's recklessness standard, which should apply also to commodity futures cases, seems reasonable. Moreover, the Hill decision reaffirms a
holding that finds great support in the language of the statute. The
Supreme Court has previously held the use of the term "manipulative"
in section 10(b) to be "virtually a term of art when used in connection
with securities markets," 3 6 and evidences a Congressional intent to require scienter. Under comparable language held to be "analogous" to
antifraud provisions under the Securities Act, the Tenth Circuit in
33. Id. at 1117-18. The court stated:
Circuits subsequently addressing the question all have concluded that reckless
behavior satisfies the scienter requirement.
This Circuit at least implicitly has concluded that recklessness is enough. See
Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764, 766-67
(10th Cir. 1980); Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th
Cir. 1980); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979).
At this time we expressly hold that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.
We do so for the same reasons given by the other circuits: first, because the
Securities Acts are to be broadly construed to achieve their remedial goals, Mansbach [v. Prescott, Ball & Turben], 598 F.2d at 1024 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151,92 S. Ct. 1456, 1470, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972));
second, because requiring the plaintiff to show intent would be unduly burdensome, [G.A.] Thompson [& Co. v. Partridge], 636 F.2d at 961 n.32; Mansbach, 598
F.2d at 1025; Rolf [v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co.], 570 F.2d at 47; and third,
because the Securities Acts were intended to proscribe actions akin to common
law fraud, see [Ernst & Ernst v.] Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212 n.32, 96 S. Ct. at 1390
n.32 (reviewing legislative history and finding that the SEC believed the rule
would proscribe fraudulent behavior), and reckless behavior satisfies the scienter
requirement of common law fraud, Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1024. For purposes of
applying Rule 1Ob-5, the best definition of reckless behavior is conduct that is "an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." Sundstrand Corp. [v. Sun
Chemical Corp.], 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev.
Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1117-18.
34. Hill, 790 F.2d at 822 n.8; cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976). However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet determined
whether recklessness is a level of culpability sufficient to meet scienter requirements. Id. at
194 n.12 (recklessness exists where one can establish the making of a statement with no
belief in its truth). See also Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). See generally, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON, W. PAGE KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 212-14 (5th ed.

1984). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's failure to conclude whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement, several lower federal courts have determined that recklessness suffices. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1983); G. A. Thomson
& Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981); Keinnam v. Homeland, Inc., 611
F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1980); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-99 (3d Cir.
1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978); Sanders v.
John Nureen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
35. Master Commodities, 586 F.2d at 1355.
36. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.
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Master Commodities determined the same to be true in CEA actions.3 7
The Supreme Court has held that intent to deceive (scienter), and not
negligence, meets the requisite culpability level intended by Congress
38
under federal securities laws.
The similar statutory construction and purposes of the securities
acts and the CEA beg the question. Both securities and commodities
laws are intended, in substantial part, to protect the investing public
from fraudulent conduct. Thus, the plain language of section 4b which
uses "cheat" and "defraud" should, as under federal securities law, require some form of purposefully misleading conduct. 3 9 It is only reasonable to conclude that an action grounded in fraud or for deceit
requires a showing of scienter. The Tenth Circuit properly determined
40
that scienter is necessary under the CEA.
Thus, in light of Hill, every trial attorney harboring a glint in his or
her eye for section 4b litigation is well advised to pay homage to scienter
requirements. However, should the facts appear insufficient to support
a finding of scienter, claims made under state law may provide an alter41
native for plaintiffs with buyers remorse.
C.

State Law Fiduciary Duty Claims And Broker Liability

Because of the potential difficulty plaintiffs may have proving scienter, the existence of a state law fiduciary duty claim is of more than academic interest. In Hill, the significance of state law fiduciary duty claims
was brought home with a vengeance by the court's holding that not only
will it "not foreclose liability" on such pendent claims, 42 but that liabil37. Master Commodities, 586 F.2d at 1355.
38. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980)
(holding scienter is required in Rule lOb-5 actions whether for damages or an enforcement action of the Securities and Exchange Commission); SEC v. Mick Stack Assoc. Inc.,
675 F.2d 1148, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 1982) (reversing and remanding a case to allow the SEC
to specifically allege scienter).
39. Master Commodities, 586 F.2d at 1356 (citing McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 347 F.
Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972)). Also directed at section 4b, the court quoted Judge Rubin in
McCurnin:
[section 5] is clearly directed only toward willfull misconduct.
The C.E.A does not use sweeping terms. Its pejoratives are simple and
pointed: it uses the words "cheat" and "defraud" and "willfully." By any definition, these connote deliberate acts or a degree of negligence so gross as to approach wilfullness....
Id.; see Ernest & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185, 199; see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1976) (holding a breach of fiduciary duty without deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure will not constitute a cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5).
40. Master Commodities, 586 F.2d at 1356. In Hill, consistent with the court's holding
that section 4b is a fraud provision, the court held "[t]he instruction on fiduciary duty
under the CEA was inappropriate and only confused that issue." Hill, 790 F.2d at 823.
The court reasoned that because liability can be found without a fraud inquiry when a
fiduciary has breached his duty to his beneficiary, if section 4b is an anti-fraud provision,
then a determination of whether it has been breached, of necessity, includes a fraud inquiry. Id.; see also McIlroy v. Dittmer, 732 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1984) (violation of section
4b(A) requires more than mere carelessness).
41. See infra notes 42-70 and accompanying text.
42. Hill, 790 F.2d at 827.
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ity under breach of fiduciary duty claims may include punitive damages.4 3
There is an old adage, that the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh
away. The same may be said of the Tenth Circuit. While the court denied Hill's claims under section 4b, it determined that, under state law
fiduciary duty claims, plaintiffs may obtain compensatory and exemplary
damages for harms suffered at the hands of unscrupulous brokers.
Although Hill held that Colorado law does not recognize a fiduciary duty
existing in all broker-customer relationships, 4 4 it also held that in those
45
cases where the duty is breached, substantial liability may attach.
Under Colorado law, such liability may exist under breach of contract or
46
breach of fiduciary duty claims.
43. Id. "We hold that under current Colorado law the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to award punitive damages to Hill." Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 824-25.
45. Although a discussion of Colorado law is beyond the scope of this article, it
should be noted that the source for Colorado law on punitive damages in fiduciary duty
claims is Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 686 P.2d 797 (Colo. App. 1983),
aff'd, 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986), a decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and not the
Colorado Supreme Court. In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508,
513-14 (Colo. 1986), the Colorado Supreme Court did not determine whether punitive
damages were available since the issue was not raised on appeal. As a general rule, issues
not presented in the trial court are deemed waived and cannot be raised on appeal. See
Christensen v. Hover, 643 P.2d 525, 531 (Colo. 1982); Matthews v. Tri-County Water
Conservancy Dist., 200 Colo. 202, 206, 613 P.2d 889, 892 (1980); McMullin v. Magnuson,
102 Colo. 230, 244-45, 78 P.2d 964, 971 (1938).
The defendants in Paine Webber, through their pleadings, did nothing to limit the
district court to the exercise of only its equitable jurisdiction, nor did they object to Caryl
Adams' request for ajury trial, which is available only in actions at law. See Kaitz v. District
Court, 650 P.2d 553, 555 (Colo. 1982). Thus, the real issue as to punitive damages did
not involve whether the trial court's power to award such damages was within its jurisdiction, but rather whether the action was an equitable one, and if so, whether exemplary
damages were available as a remedy. Properly framed, the issue did not involve a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, and since it was not raised before the
courts below, it was deemed waived. The Colorado Supreme Court noted that
In Kaitz v. District Court, 650 P.2d 553, 556 (Colo. 1982), we held that punitive damages are not available in actions in equity. However, we did not decide in
Kaitz, as Ocrant and Paine Webber now assert, that all actions involving a claim
for breach of fiduciary duties are equitable, not legal, in nature.
In Kaitz, we held that an action for breach of fiduciary duties brought by the
beneficiaries of several guardianship estates against the guardian of the estates
was one in equity. We noted that "[a]ctions by a beneficiary or ward against a
trustee or guardian in an existing trust or guardianship are generally, but not always,
equitable in nature." Id. at 555 (emphasis added). Thus, Kaitz does not foreclose
the real possibility that certain fiduciary duty claims can be tried at law, and the
court of appeals has recognized that possibility since Kaitz was decided. See Mahoney Marketing Corp. v. Sentry Builders of Colorado, Inc., 697 P.2d 1139
(Colo. App. 1985); Holter v. Moore & Co., 681 P.2d 962 (Colo. App. 1983).
Paine, Webber, 718 P.2d at 514 n.5 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
46. Paine, Webber, 718 P.2d at 508; see Uniform Fiduciaries Law, CoLo. REV. STAT.
§§ 15-1-101 (1973 & 1986 Cum. Supp.). The Colorado Uniform Fiduciaries Law includes
in its definition of a fiduciary "any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person." CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-1-103(2) (1973). Although the complaint alleged breach of
fiduciary duty, Hill elected to bring his action at common law rather than under the Colorado statute. Under the remedies available, if one can establish a knowing or bad faith
breach, punitive damages may be awarded. Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
686 P.2d 797, 802 (Colo. App. 1983).
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1. The Tenth Circuit's Application of State Law Fiduciary Duty
Claims
The district court, obviously relying on the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision in Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis (Adams),4 7 instructed the jury that a recovery under plaintiff's state law fiduciary duty
claim required proof by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) That the plaintiff reposed his trust and confidence in Wright, or
plaintiff's trust and confidence was induced from him by Wright, and
thus a fiduciary relationship existed; (2) That Wright breached
his fiduciary duty by failing to deal with the plaintiff in utmost
good faith and solely for the plaintiff's benefit in the handling
of his commodity futures account; (3) That the plaintiff incurred losses; and (4) That
the plaintiff's losses were caused by
48
Wright's breach of duty.

According to the Tenth Circuit, the district court's test, based primarily
on Hill's perceptions of his relationship with his broker, failed to sufficiently examine the actual relationship existing between Hill and Bache.
Judge Logan, speaking for the Tenth Circuit, ruled the trial court's
instruction was "too broad,"' 4 9 and held that a fiduciary duty "cannot be

defined by asking the jury to determine simply whether the principal
reposed 'trust and confidence' in the agent."' 50

The opinion noted that

a fiduciary duty, if any, arose from Hill's agency relationship with Bache.
Under agency law, agents are fiduciaries with respect to matters within
the scope of their agency. 5 1 The Tenth Circuit panel held the "trust and
confidence" instruction is simply not sufficient to define the nature of
the fiduciary duty since it fails to address the scope of the agency, which
47. 686 P.2d 797 (Colo. App. 1983), aft'd, 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986). The Adams
court stated that:
The existence of a fiduciary relationship between a customer and a stockbroker is a question of fact, and the burden of establishing its existence is upon the
party asserting its existence, here, the customer. Tschudy v. Sudler, 158 Colo.
421, 407 P.2d 877 (1965).
... [I]nvestment banking is a business based principally on the foundation of
confidence. Hughes v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1943). Under this theory, an agency analysis is applied to stockbroker-customer
relationships, and in determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists between
broker and customer, a court is to look for trust and confidence, either given by a
customer to a broker, or induced from a customer by a broker. We therefore rule
that if the facts show that the relationship between stockbroker and customer is
accompanied by proof of the customer's trust and confidence in the broker, a
fiduciary relationship is created. See generally S. GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKERDEALER PRACTICES § 8.4 (1978).
Id. at 800. (citations omitted).
48. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 823, 828. Although Judge Holloway entered an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, the panel was unanimous as to all issues other than the trial court's
exclusion of evidence of subsequent trading per FED. R. EVID. 403.
50. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824.
51. Judge Logan properly noted that "all agents are fiduciaries 'with respect to matters within the scope of [their] agency.' " Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 13 (1958); Sherman v. Schoioff, 570 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 COMMENT B (1959)).
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it viewed as the "key question." 5 2 Moreover, reasoned the court, since
the agency relationship is consensual, the inquiry, a question of fact for
the jury to determine, should focus on "what Wright had agreed to do
for Hill" and whether he "executed those tasks properly."15 3 The court
found that the jury, not being properly instructed, failed to determine
the scope of the agency relationship, if any.
2.

Control: A Bright-Line Test to Determine the Scope of the
Agency Relationship

In Colorado, the controlling jurisdiction, a professional relationship
existing between a broker and a customer does not per se establish the
fiduciary relationship. 5 4 Whether a commodity or securities broker
owes a fiduciary duty to his customer is determined by the amount of
control the broker exercises over the customer's account. The fiduciary
duty owed by a broker administering a nondiscretionary account is "very
narrow - primarily not to make unauthorized trades." '5 5 The fiduciary
duty owed by a broker administering a discretionary account is "to avoid
excessive trading" or churning. 56 Wright and Bache agreed to administer Hill's account at Bache as a nondiscretionary account. 5 7 However,
the determination as to whether an account, as originally opened, was
discretionary or nondiscretionary is not wholly dispositive as to the
scope of the broker's duty. A nondiscretionary account may be "converted," by the conduct of the parties, into a de facto discretionary account. 58 In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Adams (Paine Webber),59 the
affirmance of the Adams case, the Colorado Supreme Court held:
In assessing the existence of control by a broker, courts
have not limited the scope of their vision to the documentation
pursuant to which a customer's account is maintained, but instead have examined how account transactions have actually
been conducted. Thus, it has been held that a broker could
usurp control over a technically nondiscretionary account, rendering that broker subject to the same fiduciary duties as if the
account had been discretionary from its creation. The closely
related criterion of a broker's "involvement" in transactions in
a customer's account also has been considered material in
resolving the factual question of the existence of a fiduciary
duty. If a broker has acted as an investment advisor, and partic52. Id.
53.

Id.

54. Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 686 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo. App. 1983).
55. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824. A nondiscretionary account is an account in which the customer directs the trading and determines which purchases and sales to make. See N. WOLFSON, R. PHILIPS AND T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS,
MARKETS § 2.11 (1985).

AND SECURITIES

56. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824.
57.

Id. at 820.

58. Id. at 824. The court did not address the factors utilized to determine whether
Hill's account was a defacto discretionary account. However, the inquiry into control of the
account should support or refute such a conversion.
59. 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986).
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ularly if the customer has almost invariably followed the broker's advice, this is an indication that the broker exercises
functional control of the60account and that the broker-customer
relationship is fiduciary.
Under Hill, if Wright's actions, with Hill's acquiescence, converted the
account into a discretionary account, then Bache was in control of the
account and had at least a fiduciary duty under state law to avoid exces61
sive as well as unauthorized trading.
Although the Hill court stated it was following Adams, 62 in fact
Judge Logan's opinion, while adopting the Adams punitive damages
standard, set forth a fiduciary duty claim similar to that adopted by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Paine Webber. Much like Paine Webber, Hill
would allow state law fiduciary duty liability to rest on whether the broker exercised "functional control.''63
Whether a defendant exercises functional control is a question of
fact. The existence of functional control depends, in substantial part,
upon the sophistication, experience, intelligence, and investment acumen of the customer as well as the character, advisory or ministerial, and
64
frequency of communications between the broker and its customer.
Hill claimed that he was not a sophisticated trader and that he lacked
experience and knowledge of the mechanics of commodities trading and
risks inherent therein. It is conceivable that, under appropriate circumstances, customer sophistication alone may be determinative of control.
In Hill, however, there are other facts urging a different conclusion. For
example, "at least sixty-five" telephone conversations occurred between
65
Wright and Hill during the period in which the trades took place.
Therefore, a finding that trades were discussed before their execution is
not unlikely. Further, even though he reviewed confirmations of each
trade, Hill failed to immediately complain about or object to trades
which he claimed were made without authority. 6 6 Of course, if Hill's
version of the facts is sustained, it seems reasonable to excuse his failure
to immediately repudiate the trades. Both repudiation and ratification
require knowledge and sophistication which, according to Hill, Bache
and Wright prevented Hill from obtaining. In any event, the issues are
67
not unlike those discussed in Paine Webber.
In Paine Webber, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the decision
60. Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
61. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824. The distinction between excessive trading and unauthorized
trading often is blurred. Excessive trading, however, may occur as to transactions which,
taken alone, are suitable. Some confusion may result regarding Judge Logan's citation to
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), an important churning
case. The reference appears to be directed to the discussion of control which, once sufficiently established to prove a churning claim, should support claims regarding a fiduciary
duty and the limits of such duty.
62. Hill, 790 F.2d at 827.
63. Id. at 824; Paine Webber, 718 P.2d at 517-18.
64. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824; Paine Webber, 718 P.2d at 517-18.
65. Hill, 790 F.2d at 820.
66. Id. at 820-21.
67. Paine Webber, 718 P.2d at 517.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:2

for Caryl Adams granting her compensatory and punitive damages. Adams, who was without business acumen, acquired a securities account
previously traded in her name through settlement of her divorce. Her
former husband originally opened and traded the account. After the
divorce, Adams advised Ocrant, Paine Webber's representative, she
would trade her account. Thereafter, Ocrant had numerous contacts
68
with Adams and "maintained close personal and social contacts."
Finding Ocrant "engendered customer's reliance and growing trust,"
the appellate court determined Ocrant eventually controlled and
churned the account. 69 Caryl Adams relied totally and solely upon
Paine Webber. The trial court awarded damages and the Colorado
Supreme Court, in declining to adopt a rule that a broker/customer relationship is, per se, fiduciary, held "that proof of practical control of a
customer's account by a broker will establish that the broker owes fiduciary duties to the customer with regard to the broker's handling of the
customer's account.''70
Consistent with Paine Webber, the Tenth Circuit rejected a test
which, applied by the district court, required only a determination of
whether the customer "reposed trust and confidence" in his broker.
Separately, both the Tenth Circuit and the Colorado Supreme Court
adopted a "functional control" test as determinative of state law fiduciary duty claims.
3.

Broker Compliance: Customer Disclosure Documents and
Subsequent Trading Behavior

The court did determine that the "[v]iolation of an internal rule of a
'7 1
brokerage house alone is not sufficient for imposition of liability."
However, the effect of the use and nature of risk disclosure documents,
customer suitability forms, and related documents 72 upon broker liabil68. Adams, 686 P.2d at 799.
69. Id.
70. Paine Webber, 718 P.2d at 517. In Paine Webber, the Colorado Supreme Court set
forth various factors intended to determine whether the broker directly exercised control
over the account as a discretionary account or otherwise. These factors include the broker's involvement in transactions, his actions as an investment advisor, his trading of a
customer's account without prior approval, and the investor's investment acumen. Id. at
516-17.
71. Hill, 790 F.2d at 821 n.4.
72. Under CEA Rules 1.55 and 33.7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.55, 33.7 (1986), an FCM must
advise its customer of risks associated with commodities trading at the time the account is
opened and approved for trading. The process for accomplishing this is carried out by use
of compliance documents such as risk disclosure statements. FCMs must make a written
disclosure indicating trading is not suitable for all potential customers, the volatile nature
of commodities trading, and the potential for substantial loss. Customers are advised they
should not engage in trading until they understand the nature and extent of their rights
and obligations. On the other hand, customer suitability forms, which are usually completed by the customer with the FCM agent, provide information intended to enable the
FCM to determine whether commodities trading is appropriate in light of the customer's
investment objectives and previous investment or trading history. Other documents allow
management and compliance personnel within the firm to supervise and control the actions of the FCM's employees. Together, these compliance documents make a necessary
disclosure to customers while enabling the firm to meet its obligations under the CEA.
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ity was not articulated by the Tenth Circuit. While only briefly commenting upon the use of disclosure documents, the Hill court
encouraged their use by stating "courts generally are reluctant to find
that there have been misrepresentations when a prospective customer
has received disclosure documents." 7 3 From a policy standpoint, the
use of disclosure documents should be encouraged to allow investors
and the public to benefit from disclosure. At the same time, proof that
the disclosure and suitability forms were used should not absolve brokers of any and all claims of wrongdoing. Although the CEA provides
traders with the means to recover from the unscrupulous broker, the
commodity laws were never intended to relieve investors of their vigil
nor to reward naivete. As stated by Professor Loss: "Congress did not
take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making a fool of
74
him."
Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that evidence of subsequent trading
which "lasted for a similar short period of time, exhibited a similar type
and frequency of trading, followed a similar pattern of phone calls, and
resulted in a similar loss" is admissible in cases involving claims of unauthorized trading. 75 During the trial, Bache offered evidence of subsequent and similar trading initiated by Hill at another firm only five
months after liquidating his account at Bache. The district court excluded the evidence, ruling that its probative value was outweighed by
its potential for confusion and delay. 7 6 The Tenth Circuit, while recognizing the broad discretion of the trial court to determine whether evidence is irrelevant, held the trial court in error, reversed, and ruled that
evidence of subsequent trading is admissible and of probative value in
determining whether Hill authorized the trades, Bache's involvement,
and whether Hill or Bache was responsible for the losses. 77 In ruling on
the probative value, the court suggested that summary or expert testi78
mony may be used to lessen the likelihood of confusion or delay.
D.

Conclusion

If the Hill opinion has a flaw, it is the court's recognition of two
distinct actions which may be brought by customers against their broThey may prove instrumental in providing evidence of the firm's conduct and the scope of
its agency relationship with particular customers.
73. Hill, 790 F.2d at 824 (citing Markham, Customer Rights Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1314-16 (1984)). Bache provided Hill several documents including a copy of its Standard Disclosure Statement, required under Rule 1.55, 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.55 (1986).
74. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 36 (1983).
75. Hill, 790 F.2d at 826.
76. Id; see FED. R. EVID. 401. A discussion of the rules of evidence is beyond the
scope of this article, but counsel should be aware of this development.
77. The Tenth Circuit ruled that "[gliven the high probative value of the evidence of
Hill's later trading and the low and controllable danger of confusion and delay, we must
hold that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded all evidence of the later
trading." Hill, 790 F.2d at 826-27.
78. Id. at 826.
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kers. Confusion may arise because each of these claims has different
procedural and substantive thresholds. However, not only is the court's
dichotomy reasonable, but the cumulative remedy approach, providing
two distinct causes of action to address different types of wrongdoing
from the same conduct, is not unique under federal law. Any doubt as
to such an approach should have been resolved by Justice Marshall's
opinion in Herman and Maclean v. Huddleston,79 holding such an approach
is not novel and that the Act and the Exchange Act "prohibit some of
the same conduct." 80 Huddleston is more than sufficient authority and
precedent to sustain the Tenth Circuit's reasoning.8 1
II.

SECURITIES REGULATION

Two additional cases worthy of note which were decided during the
survey period are McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co. 8 2 and San
Francisco-OklahomaPetroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co.83 Both involve the age-old debate: what is a "security?" A debate which will continue in search of resolution as long as promoters exercise American
ingenuity and yankee know-how to "use the money of others on the
promise of profits." 8 4 The McGill case should be of particular interest
to those attorneys representing partnership or joint venture enterprises. 8 5 In addition, the Carstan Oil case presents a discussion of "controlling person" liability.
A.

Definition of a Security8 6
1. McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co.
McGill involved a successful attempt by plaintiff Gene McGill to re-

79. 459 U.S. 375 (1983); see also A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD &
CoMmoDrrs FRAUD § 2.5(4) (1985).
80. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 383 (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778
(1979)).
81. Id.
82. 776 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1985).
83. 765 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1985).
84. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (determined the sale of interests in orange groves was a security and called for a broad, "not technical," application of
the definition of "security").
85. As to whether a joint venture or general partnership interest may be a security,
see SEC v. Professional Assoc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,421
(6th Cir. 1983) (passive investors in joint venture acquire a security); Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (a joint venture or general
partner interest may be a security where the investor has only the power of a limited partner or where the investor is so dependent on a promoter, that he cannot exercise meaningful venture or partnership power); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973)
(determination of whether an interest is a "security" depends upon the facts and circumstances; applied the economic realities test to hold a partnership interest was not a
security).
86. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1),
defines a "security" as:
[Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
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scind his purchase of a joint venture interest and obtain a return of his
original investment. McGill was approached by defendants and offered
the opportunity to purchase an interest in a "sure-fire investment,"8 7 a
joint venture to develop certain real estate located near Duncan,
Oklahoma. The joint venture investment was represented by the defendants as "risk-free" since all lots were sold or under contract for sale
assuring future development. 8 8 McGill accepted the offer and invested
$80,000. Under the terms of the joint venture agreement, McGill was to
"recoup his original investment and, in addition, receive half of any
profits" derived from the joint venture enterprise.8 9 Contrary to representations made to McGill, the joint venture remained inactive and was
eventually liquidated. Dissatisfied with the venture, McGill filed a civil
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma alleging violations of sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Act. 90
He also alleged, inter alia, 9 1 violations of section 10(b) 9 2 of the Ex9
change Act and Rule lOb-5.

3

Applying the Supreme Court's "investment contract" test first established in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.9 4 and later refined in United Housing
Foundation,Inc. v. Forman,9 5 the trial court held the joint venture agreement "did not constitute a 'security' because it did not give rise to a 'common
enterprise,' "96 and dismissed the action. The Howey-Forman test defines
an "investment contract" and, thus, determines a "security" to exist
where there is: (1) an investment (2) in a common enterprise (3) with
the expectation of profits (4) to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others. 9 7 Finding McGill to be the sole investor,
the district court determined the interest was not a security because
there was no "pooling of funds received by a promoter from multiple
investors." 9 8 The trial court, however, mistakenly relied upon precedent in the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, all confractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,... or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also section 3(a)(10) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(10) (1982). Although slightly different, according to the Supreme Court both are to be treated as "virtually identical."
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36
(1967).
87. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 925
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
91. McGill's complaint also included a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 and Supp. III 1985) and pendent
claims under Oklahoma law. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
94. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
95. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
96. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924 (emphasis added).
97. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298-99; Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
98. McGill, 776 F.2d at 924.
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trary to the law in the Tenth Circuit.9 9
Noting that the "Supreme Court has never decided whether 'horizontal commonality' is required before a joint venture can constitute a
'common enterprise,'" as well as the "split in authority among the circuits," 1 00 the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court rejected what it referred to as the "rigid 'horizontal commonality' requirement" which it
stressed has never been part of the law of the Tenth Circuit.1 0 ' Instead,
the panel held, courts in the Tenth Circuit must follow the Supreme
Court's "direction" in Tcherepnin v. Knight 102 and "determine the 'economic reality' of the transactions that occurred" to conclude 0 whether
3
they give rise to a common enterprise within the Howey test.'
The court's logic is sound. The record before the court disclosed a
scheme by which promoters sought an individual investor to provide
capital to fund an enterprise totally within the control of the promoters.
The interest was sold to McGill as an "investment." The joint venture
agreement provided, upon liquidation, for a return of capital and half 0of4
any profits, not a purchase of assets or other commercial transaction.'
Unfortunately, the court did not set forth specific factors for its
"economic reality" test. However, it appears that, where appropriate,
the answers to the following questions will control on a case-by-case basis: (1) Do the promoters intend to continue to manage and operate the
enterprise?' 0 5 (2) Is there a substantial lack of control or participation in
the management of the venture by the purchaser?' 0 6 (3) Are the interests sold in a manner intended to induce or create in the purchaser an
expectation that he is participating in an investment? 10 7 (4) Does the
interest represent an investment as opposed to a commercial venture? 10 8 and (5) Is the return to the purchaser dependent upon how
profitable the venture is? 10 9 If the answer to any one of these questions
is yes, arguably a common enterprise exists. 1 10
In lieu of setting out an objective, clearly defined test, the Tenth
Circuit relied upon McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage
Investors."'1 McGovern Plaza held that where purchasers or investors provide the capital, in exchange for profits, and the sellers or promoters
99. Id. The trial court relied on Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 682
F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 622 F.2d 216
(6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Milnarik v. M. S. Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
100. McGill, 776 F.2d at 925 n.2.
101. Id. at 925.
102. 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
103. McGill, 776 F.2d at 925.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 927.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 923-24.
108. Id. at 925-26.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 926; see Hillard & Ricciardelli, Investment Contracts Under the Colorado and Uniform Securities Acts, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 391, 426-29 (1978).
111. 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977).
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manage and operate the enterprise, a security exists.12 In McGovern
Plaza, the suspect interest, a construction loan coupled with a permanent, long-term commitment, did not constitute a security because the
transaction was "purely commercial" and the plaintiff purchasers "were
dependent on their own efforts" to make a profit." 13 Further, the court
distinguished McGovern Plaza from its earlier decision in United States v.
Austin,' 1 4 where it held a loan commitment to be a security. Austin was
distinguishable, according to the court, because the purchasers "were
induced, by advertising and solicitation, to put up money with the expectation of profits," ' 1 5 a conclusion derived by applying the economic
realities test.
Although the rhyme may be absent, in McGill, the reason is clear. A
joint venture agreement between a promoter and a single investor,
which in economic reality is an investment, involves the sale of a security
and provides the purchaser protection under the Act despite the absence of a pooling of funds from multiple investors. Ifthe nature of the
transaction were solely determined by the number of investors - multiple or single - the sale of interests which might otherwise be securities
would be determined by factors not relevant to the substance. A promoter who was fortuitous enough to have his activities questioned
before making an offer to a second investor might escape the reach of
the Act only because he was stopped before making offers to an additional unsuspecting investor.
The Tenth Circuit's commercial/investment test places the focus of the inquiry on the character of
the interest sold and the nature of the transaction.' 1 6 McGill isconsistent with other Tenth Circuit opinions't 7 which have relied upon the
parties' economic arrangements and understandings rather than being
constrained by the limitations of the technical application of the "investment contract" test.' 18
112. Id. at 647.
113. Id.
114. 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
115. McGovern Plaza, 562 F.2d at 648.
116. The Supreme Court has long required courts to recognize substance over form.
See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. C. M. Joiner, 320
U.S. 344 (1943).
117. Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoeller and Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d
1059 (10th Cir. 1976); McGovern Plaza, 562 F.2d at 647; Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak,
Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972); Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th
Cir 1967). McGovern Plaza was cited by the court, and although Mr. Steak and Continental
Marketing were not cited - perhaps because they turned on the efforts or participation of
the purchaser - they also speak to the "economic realities" test applied by the Tenth
Circuit.
118. The test applied under state law may differ from the commercial/investment dichotomy test or economic realities test of the Tenth Circuit. For example, in two cases,
the Colorado Supreme Court set forth the "investment contract" test. See Raymond Lee
Organization v. Division of Securities, 556 P.2d 1209 (Colo. 1976) and Lowery v. Ford Hill
Investments Co., 556 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1976). In Raymond Lee, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that certain invention agreements between investors and a promoter which did
not result in a pooling of interests between investors was not a common enterprise and
therefore did not involve the sale of a "security." Raymond Lee, 556 P.2d at 1212-13.
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San Francisco-OklahomaPetroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil,
Co.

Like McGill Carstan also involved a plaintiff seeking rescission of his
purchase of an interest claimed to be a "security." ' 1 9 Carstan Oil Company, Inc. (Carstan) was organized for the purpose of selling undivided
interests in oil properties. Defendants William Rogers (Rogers) and
Courtney Rogers (Courtney), father and son respectively, were directors
of Carstan. Rogers provided the money to organize the company and
was its sole shareholder. Courtney was an active participant in the company, but due to problems with creditors, had his father, Rogers, appear
as the owner and a director. Courtney's name was not used but he was,
20
in fact, running the company.1
Carstan offered investors interests in producing wells, which were
located in Kansas and were to be operated by Carstan. The interests
were offered for sale through advertisements in newspapers of general
circulation in several states. The record before the trial court established that Rogers signed the corporate minutes, was aware of the sales
of the undivided interests and purchased one himself, and had actual
knowledge of the transactions and how they were handled. The interplaintiff brought suit
ests, however, were never registered, and 12the
1
under both federal and state securities laws.
The trial court entered summary judgments against Courtney and
the corporation, but the judgments remained unsatisfied since the obligations of both Carstan and Courtney were discharged in bankruptcy.
The remaining defendant, Rogers, who was not involved in the bankruptcy proceeding and was thus the only solvent defendant and the sole
source to effect rescission, was determined to be a "controlling person"
under section 15 of the Act. 122 Reasoning that Rogers did not have sufficient knowledge of the facts, however, the trial court found him not
23
liable. 1
The Tenth Circuit, utilizing the "investment contract" test, held the
interest, a fractional undivided working interest in an oil lease connected to an operating agreement, to be a "security."' 1 2 4 This holding is
not unique nor does it conflict with the court's decision in McGill. Reading both McGill and Carstan together,' 2 5 it appears that Tenth Circuit
courts must follow a two-step process. First, the court must make an
independent determination as to whether the particular interest before
it meets the literal language of any term in section 2(1) of the Act or
comes within the definition of any such term. If so, the inquiry is completed and the interest is a "security." Second, assuming the interest is
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Carstan, 765 F.2d at 963.
Id.
Id. at 964.
Id. at 963; see 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1985).
Carstan, 765 F.2d at 963.
Id. at 966.
Id.
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not determined to be a "security" under the first step, the "economic
realities" or "commercial/investment" analysis of the second step is
applied.
In Carstan, the interest met the first element of the test since the
express terms of section 2(1) include a "fractional undivided interest in
oil... rights" and an "investment contract." 126 Because the interest fit
neatly into the statutory definition of a "security," unlike McGill, further
inquiry was not necessary.
In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp. ,127 the Supreme Court, without
specifically addressing whether the subject oil leases were investment
contracts, held the sale of oil leases encumbered with a drilling agreement was more than the sale of naked leasehold rights. After examining
the relationships of the various parties and noting the purchaser's reliance upon the promoters, the Court determined such interests were "securities." The interests sold by Carstan are indistinguishable from those
in Joiner. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's two-step process is in accord
with the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Landreth Timber Company v.
28
Landreth. 1
As his defense, Rogers argued that the plenary language of Section
2, "unless the context otherwise requires," should be applied and the
interest should be deemed unusual or unique so as to escape the reach
of the Act. 129 Although persons making such an argument may find
comfort in the Supreme Court's decision in Forman, Is0 under the facts
prevalent here such comfort is misplaced. The defendant's argument
goes beyond Forman. The only statement in support of his argument
offered by Rogers was not the uniqueness of the interest but that "the
transaction was between knowledgeable experienced parties in the oil
business."'1'
Although the knowledge and experience of the investor
may speak to whether the interest must be registered or is exempt, such
an argument is futile and of no consequence in determining whether the
interest is a "security." Roger's argument fell on deaf ears, and properly so. The argument, used in earlier cases,' 32 may be quickly dis126. Id. at 965. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra note 86.
127. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
128. 471 U.S. 681 (1986). The Tenth Circuit's decision follows the suggested analysis
in Landreth and United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), two Supreme
Court decisions that should be read together. These decisions similarly address the definition of a "security." In Landreth, the Court, citing Forman, rejected the sale of business
doctrine, which had its genesis in the Tenth Circuit. Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,966 (10th Cir. 1977). The Court reversed a Ninth
Circuit opinion and held that the transfer or sale of interests denominated "stock" and
which have attributes commonly associated with stock under state law (i.e., dividends, voting rights, etc.) are securities under the Act. However, the Supreme Court expressly limited its analysis in Landreth to "stock."
129. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 965.
130. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
131. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 965.
132. Id. (citing Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970) and Woodward v.
Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959)); see also Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d
893 (5th Cir. 1977).
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posed of by referral to SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. 13 3 and SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co. 134 A "security" does not lose its character because it
is offered to a few.13 5 This ill-conceived interpretation of the reach of
the Act should not move a court any more than a similar argument as36
serting an exemption from registration for an offering made to a few. 1
Even those who mistook Forman to represent a hostility in the attitude of
the Supreme Court to the federal securities laws should now recognize
this fact.
B.

"Controlling Person" Liability

In Carstan, the court of appeals also set aside the trial court's determination that William Rogers (Rogers) did not have sufficient knowledge to be held accountable as a "controlling person."' 13 7 The district
court held that Rogers did not have "knowledge of or reasonable
ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability" of Carstan was determined. ' 3 8 The panel found the position of
39
the trial court to be contrary to the record.1
It does seem rather anomalous that the trial court could conclude
that Rogers - who organized the corporation, was aware of its purpose,
signed the corporate minutes and reports, knew the corporate business
and knew its business was effected through the mails - had no knowledge of the existence of the facts. Moreover, the trial record also established that Rogers personally purchased interests similar to those sold to
investors and acted to involve his acquaintances in the enterprise as
shareholders. 140 As his defense, Rogers claimed he was merely a "figurehead" director and as such acted only to allow his name to be used
because his son could not use his own name. He further argued that he
neither participated in nor made an effort to learn what the corporation
was doing. 14'
As a fair reading of Rule
session ...

405142

requires, control "means the pos-

of the power to direct," but does not require the exercise of

133. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
134. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
135. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1986); SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
136. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125.
137. Section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides, in pertinent part:
Every person, who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise ....

controls any person liable under section [11 or 12] shall also be liable ... unless
the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in
the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person
is alleged to exist.
Id. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1986) provides:
The term "control". .. means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power
to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.
138. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 964 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77o).
139. Id. at 964-65.
140. Id. at 964.
141.

Id.

142.

17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1986); see supra note 130.
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such power. The essential issue on appeal was not whether Rogers had
control but whether he came within the knowledge exception. Relying
on Myzel v. Fiekds,'4 3 the appellate court held Rogers may not have been
aware of each and every transaction, but from his involvement even as a
figurehead director, he was aware of the "existence of the basic facts
relating to the course of business of the corporation."' 14 4 Whether liability would attach in the case of a director who made an effort to find
out information regarding his enterprise and was unable to do so, or was
prevented from doing so, was not before the court.
The underlying rationale for "controlling person" liability is to supplant the doctrine of respondeat superior with a new claim to reach those
defendants who could potentially evade liability by exercising power
through "dummy" corporations and to hold accountable those persons
who could control an offending issuer or corporation but fail to do so.
The defense of "no knowledge" should only be available to those acting
in good faith. Roger's lax exercise or the failure to exercise his duties as
a director of the corporation and his ostrich-head-in-the-sand approach
should not be rewarded. Nor should similar conduct in others be encouraged by extending the "no knowledge" defense to those acting or
failing to act in good faith. 145 The appeals court properly noted that as
a director, Rogers "had the duty to know the basic or sole function for
the corporation - the sale of undivided interests - and how this was
46
being carried out."1
In Carstan, the Tenth Circuit acted reasonably by interpreting section 15 of the Act in a manner which should induce those who have the
power to control an issuer to do so. Had the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the trial court, only those defendants who were discharged in
bankruptcy would have been held accountable and Rogers, an active
participant, would have escaped liability. One can only hope that the
judicious interpretation of the federal securities laws will serve to prevent fraud and that antifraud provisions are applied to provide a remedy
to illegal actions and omissions of wrongdoers including those who
knowingly fail to cause persons within their control to act within the law.
CONCLUSION

If we have learned anything during the recent retrenchment caused
by the Supreme Court's decisions respecting securities actions, 147 it can
be fairly stated in two rules of thumb: (1) federal law, in its sanctions,
143. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
144. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 965. Although not discussed in the Tenth Circuit opinion,
recall that under opinions addressing state law, "figurehead" directors are held to the
same standard as other directors. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super. 355, 392
A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), aff'd, 87 N.J. 15,432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1979). See
generally Veasey, Insights intoJudicial Deference to Directors' Business Decisions: Should we Trust the

Courts?, 39 Bus. LAw. 1461-1559 (1984) and 40 Bus. LAw. 1373-1455 (1985).
145. See Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981).
146. Carstan, 765 F.2d at 964.
147. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indust., Inc. v.
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and morality are not coextensive, 14 8 and; (2) considerations of fairness
or injustice under state law are not coterminous with fraud under federal law. 14 9 This lesson was restated by the Tenth Circuit in Hill v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. For the Pyrrhonist, Hill makes it clear that commodities and securities fraud actions based on negligence have indeed
"gone the way of the do-do bird." For others, Hill illustrates the serious
implications for actions by customers against their brokers under state
law fiduciary duty claims. Additionally, at least in the Tenth Circuit, regardless of the ingenuity of promoters, a scheme or plan which in "economic reality" constitutes an investment, whereby one uses the money of
others on the promise of profits, involves a "security."

Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
148. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654, 667-68, 678-79 (1983) (Blackmun,J., dissenting);
see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Earlier securities cases, beginning withJ.I. Case Co. v. Berah, 377 U.S. 426 '1964) and
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), in which the Supreme Court first recognized and later embellished on implied causes of action, found their capstone in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The current Court's predisposition
may be the result of political persuasion more than legal analysis. To quote one commentator: "the Court underlined its conclusions with policy considerations drawn not from
considerations of fairness or effectuation of the securities laws' purposes, but from strong
principles of federalism." Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lOb-5
and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263, 271 (1981).
149. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985); Santa Fe Indust., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977).

